We need to look at other "like" teams when evaluating the OU defensive performance under Venables. We chose to dig into Texas' defensive stats then brush upon other teams with similarities to Oklahoma. The Longhorns were chosen as a comparable team due to their perceived superior defensive play over the timeframe of this analysis. This theory was supported through data attained from http://www.cfbstats.com pertaining to Big 12 conference total defense ratings since 2007. See below for a Texas/OU comparison in this area. I'll note that the overall total defense is determined by yards given up per game and is restricted to only conference contests. Also, we discussed Oklahoma under Venables (exclusively) as short time back; that article can be found here.

Here is how Texas fared defensively overt the past 11 seasons:

As you can see, the Longhorns struggled mightily against the pass from '06 to '09. Will Muschamp's arrival in Austin aided to fix this glaring issue as Texas improved against the pass in each of his three seasons as DC. Texas was 40^th or worse in four of these eleven seasons but their scoring defense never fell below 50 throughout these analyzed seasons. Conference ranking in scoring fluttered to best in conference three of the seasons, second best in two, and third best In three. I will note that the '02 and '09 scoring defenses were third best in conference yet eighth and 12^th overall nationally, respectively.

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West Virginia will throw a new look at Clemson's offense that they have not faced this year. Defensive Coordinator Jeff Casteel employs a 3-3 Odd Stack defense that uses 3 down linemen who play similar to the usual 3-4 linemen, 3 quick linebackers and 5 DBs. While facing 4-2-5 or 4-1-6 defenses is pretty common when you play a set of spread formations like we do, very few teams base out of a 5 DB set with just 3 down linemen. It is not something our guys have seen, and given our demonstrated problems with picking up weird defensive looks, it could pose a problem for Clemson's front. The coverage flexibilities it allows could also pose problems for Boyd and our WRs. We felt it was necessary to give a primer on this defense because it is so different in the looks it throws at an offense, and it will enlighten those who did not understand Vic Koenning’s scheme.

What is the benefit to trying a 3-3-5 scheme? Versatility, deception, and adding speed on the field. The blitz can come from anywhere and it will come often. With 8 guys who have coverage skills, there will often be one
dropping that you do not expect to drop, and a blitzer that your OL has not accounted for. CBs playing press can blitz and the WR can be picked up fairly quickly. Safeties blitz and a speedy LB can drop immediately into that zone. It is also a defense based out of an 8-man front concept against pro personnel groupings. There is no front look that a 3-3 team can't employ to confuse. Also, adding the 5th DB in regular sets puts another guy with 4.5-4.6 speed on the field instead of a big slow lineman or moderately fast LB.

The real differences between a 3-3-5 and 3-4 are in the personnel used at LB and DB, along with the shifting used along the front. While 3-4 DL can have one-gap or two-gap alignments, Casteel's front uses a mix. The NG is nearly always aligned as a 0-technique, on the Center's head, and plays two-gap. The two DEs play either a 4i or 5 most of the time, and in pass-definite situations they'll play wider, in a 6 or more. This tells you that the DE's are not playing two-gap assignments. That means they are not trying to eat up OL to protect LBs, as two-gap 3-4 defenses do. They are trying to get pressure on the QB. These linemen do change their positions based on formation, whereas most 3-4 front teams do not. If the TE is weak/strong, they will stem the linemen so far as a 4i-0-7 alignment. Casteel also uses stunting between the DL and LBs very often.

LB positioning is not as set as 4-3 or 3-4 teams either. The LBs are almost never in the same place more than two plays in a row, and are constantly shifting positions based on call or formation. If the offense presents a power set, one will come to the LOS, either on a Guard or outside a Tackle. They have also shifted the LBs towards the strength and the DL away from it on film. However, with just 3 DL in front and only 3 LBs, these guys must be
very good tacklers. There is a method to their alignment changes, because they do remain a gap-aligned defense, and we’ll explain it below.

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Virginia Tech’s defense is a unique one in major college football in that it is very much an older style of defense descended from the Gap 8 and Wide Tackle 6. When Frank Beamer coached under Bobby Ross, they ran the Wide Tackle 6, and he took that with him to VT. It is actually not a 4-3 base, as its introduced on your TV sets, but is a 4-4 front that has morphed into using 4-3 personnel. Most of the time, there is a safety/LB hybrid that is dropped into the box to create a true 8 man front. The reason why they can adapt to spread offenses reasonably well is because of the player they put at the hybrid position. It’s a different approach from VK’s 4-2-5, which dropped one SS into the box, but essentially a 4-2-5 plays like a 4-4 front against any pro-style 2-TE/1-2 back offense. How did you think TCU was able to defeat teams like Wisconsin with their 4-2-5?

However, what VT does is very different from TCU and here we’ll showcase the fronts and coverages VT likes the most. The primary reason why more teams don’t try to run this type of scheme is because of the inability to find the two swing players however, and you need them to play against spread teams.

VT’s version of defense is a morphed descendent of what the Washington Huskies ran in the 80s and early 90s when their defense dominated the Pacific coast under DC Jim Lambright. They made popular the "G" front and took the 1985 Bear’s 46 defensive front as a compliment, which Tech would call the "Tuff" package. 46 does not stand for 4 DL and 6 LBs, the name is derived from the player Buddy Ryan used to play one of the attacking LB positions. His number was 46. It is actually a base 4-4 front. The defensive front called "Bear" is part of the 46 defense, but they are separable things. A "Bear" front covers both OGs and the Center, making it an Odd front. A 46 is by definition a "Bear" front, but to use "Bear" does not necessarily mean a 46 defense. The "G" front is a 4-man Even front that covers both OGs with DTs, and is heavy on stunting. Because its Even, the Center is totally uncovered. So complimenting it with the Bear front gives you the choice of going Even or Odd with a stem (pre-snap shift). It is generally made with a 2i-technique on the weakside (Wide 6) and a 3-technique strongside (Split 6), so its quite close to the Over front (1 tech weak, 3-tech strong). The strongside End, called a "Stud", aligns over the inside of the TE (7 technique) and the other DE aligns in a 5-technique. VT shifts their G front to the Field side as well into a 4-3, whether its weak or strong, which gives them 3 fronts in the base package. This "Field G" is mostly what Virginia Tech is in nowadays.

Because of their Field/Boundary alignment philosophy, the same defenders do not always get matched on the same offensive players. Nuk Hopkins is usually a Boundary-side WR, so he gets the Boundary CB most of the time. However, if he goes Fieldside, he'd be matched on someone else. Watkins is usually Fieldside.

The "G" front is the base front, but here I have not adjusted to the formation.

Because it’s a 4-4 defense that has to be able to handle the spread offense at times, it needs some rather special players at some of the hybrid LB spots. The WHIP LB is a weakside LB, analogous to a JACK LB in a 3-4, who often blitzes off the edge in pressure situations, but who has to be able to cover backs well. He does not have to be a big guy, but he does have to have a very high motor. He can have a SS build and sometimes aligns deeper, like the FS. You’ll see how they get away with that in coverage later.

The 46 defensive front. Not adjusted to the offensive formation.

Field G front. Rover adjusts to the better receivers or Field side. Whip starts back and creeps up or vice versa.

The Rover is an OLB who plays more coverage, like a SS. Think DeAndre McDaniel. His initial alignment is quite often in the box, but he doesn’t get up on the LOS as much as the WHIP. Rover always goes to the side of the passing strength (not necessarily the TE side) or the Field side, and WHIP always aligns opposite the Rover. If the ball is on the hashmark, Rover goes Field side, WHIP to the boundary. WHIP often creeps up because he usually gets a 1 on 1 matchup with the RB in coverage.

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Coordinator Ellis Johnson and the South Carolina defense utilize non-conventional yet versatile base defense in the 4-2-5. Many college coaches are looking to the 4-2-5 to slow down spread offenses, provide more options for base personnel groupings, create defensive versatility, and disguise defensive strategy. This scheme uses typical down linemen (two ends and two tackles), a weak side linebacker (Will), a middle backer (MIKE), two safeties (boundary and field), two corners, and a hybrid "Spur" position. The "Spur" player is what really makes this defense unique when compared to most base 4-3 and Nickel defenses. Spur's decision making ability and athleticism makes or breaks this scheme.

The 4-2-5 as a base utilizes line play similar to the 4-3. One difference between the two is the strong side DE typically plays head up on the TE instead of lining up on his outside shoulder. This scheme also gives you many of the same blitz opportunities as the 4-3 and allows for all the standard zone packages. The advantage, when played properly, in this defense is flexibility gained utilizing the Spur.

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I'm going to tell you all some things that you don't want to hear first.

There is no defensive scheme that "solves" the option, and there will never be one that "solves" the option.

 4-3, 4-2-5, 3-3-5, 3-4, 4-4, etc., does not mean anything. Just because a team beats GT with a 4-2-5 or 3-3-5 does not mean they have "solved" the option. If you think that just because Kansas showed more 4-2-5 and 3-3-5 sets is the reason they beat GT, and that Kevin Steele should do the same thing just because Kansas won the game against them, then you are a dumbass and you don't know shit about the option.

The basic scheme that we played against GT on Thursday night last year is the same one that Iowa used to defeat them in the Bowl game.

The basic scheme that we played against GT on Thursday night last year is the same one that LSU used to defeat them in the Bowl game.

The basic scheme that we played against GT on Thursday night last year is the same one that Miami used to defeat them last season.

The basics of that scheme is the one we wrote up prior to last offseason right here. There are minor tweaks with bringing up players from the secondary in alignment and a tweak in alignment of the Linebackers, but the assignments were all apparent and very similar to anyone who was paying attention. Its the scheme I would play and the one that we used to force GT into the most 3 & outs they had of any opponent last year in that Thursday night game. We lost that game because we got outcoached, plain & simple.

So then why did GT lose to a Kansas team that lost to a 1-AA squad? Why did they lose to Iowa or Miami and not us?

Because their OL got the hell beat out of them and they couldnt block worth a damn against them. That was the overriding factor in controlling Paul Johnson's triple option in each of these games. I watched part of the Kansas game yesterday, and their OL play was atrocious. I vividly remember watching the Iowa game, and the DEs for Iowa were planting Nesbitt on his ass nearly every play and their DL as a whole completely overran Georgia Tech up front. That is why they couldn't take over the clock and grind them into dust. The second factor, and similarly important, is that teams like Iowa or LSU jumped well ahead of Georgia Tech, and it took them out of their gameplan early.

Football is always going to be about blocking and tackling. If your Front whips them, you will stop them. If GT plays really well up front, they're going to get yards. If they have good backs + that blocking, they're going to get wins, so stop this BS that keeps getting posted on message boards about "GT will be stopped because people will figure out how to stop the option." Thats nonsense. GT will be stopped through recruiting of their linemen and backs, or their defensive players, long before somebody "solves" the option. The option has been around since the beginning of football and its always going to be here. Florida runs an option-based system, Oregon is heavy on the option, and both run a version of a spread Midline attack and Veer that GT runs constantly and the basic differences are just the formation and who is doing the blocking.

Now I'm going to tell you something that you do want to hear, and probably felt after the ACCCG: 

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Since it continually comes up, and everyone seems to think that every time the QB runs with it or every run play from shotgun is a zone read, we feel the need to discuss exactly what the Zone Read play is and how and why Clemson has such trouble with it, with help from Coach Huey. We'll make a separate post on how to defend the other popular shotgun/pro-set run plays later this week.

The above video explains pretty simply what the Zone read is, as do the cutups of the play below in actual game situations. There are other plays that are run inside from the Gun quite often, like the trap and counter trey/trap, and the power (though less frequently), or a simple zone play. The primary reason we have trouble defending it is numbers, gap control, and the inability for our LBs to make reads and get off blocks.

When you play the UNDER front as Clemson does most, against 21 (2-back, 1TE) personnel you end up with an 8-man front and the ability to outnumber the offense at the point of attack. When they start substituting WRs for RBs or TEs, you end up with mismatches. If your OLBs cannot stay in-step in man/man coverage with those substituted players then you have no choice but to use a DB instead (nickel or dime). Even if you do have those LBs, you have to realign them, possibly (and quite likely) taking them out of the box to matchup. Most of the time, you'll end up with only 6 in the box.  In this case you can still outnumber the offense (only 5 OL vs 6 defenders) but when one of them misses his assignment, when the back feints a pass route (taking a LB with him), the offense aligns their WRs wider, or when the back blocks for the QB Iso, you could have a bad day.

The Wildcat is a case where you have a numbers problem. Now the QB is a RB, and the back beside him blocks, but otherwise the plays they run are exactly the same as ones where the QB is handing off to a back. Zone read teams that are successful have a QB who can run, meaning there are 6 blockers and 6 defenders in the box with a Nickel set and the QB is unaccounted for. If you simply drop your FS/SS in the box, you put him at a disadvantage in pass defense. A good OC will see what you do and simply call a play action pass with the same blocking scheme as the zone read.

The typical strategy for defending the zone read is the scrape exchange between the backside End and the backside LB. The other is to have the End sit (to wait without attacking) and have the backside LB take the cutback lane from the RB, effectively making the play into the usual inside zone. I have seen Kevin Steele run both. You take the 2nd way when the QB is extremely dangerous, otherwise use the scrape exchange. Always make the less-talented runner keep the ball.

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With Kevin Steele’s preference to take out the SAM backer against spread formations we felt it would be useful to spend some time going over 4-2-5 and Nickel defenses. Additionally, since some have asked us how one defends the spread and why Clemson had such a difficult time with running QBs and the rush defense against Wildcat and spread teams last year we'll show the problems we have had with the Nickel against the run game.

Kevin Steele’s defense is very similar to Saban’s schemes as I’ve said. Saban, since returning from the NFL, has veered more into the 30 (3-man) front, but in reality Saban still runs 40 fronts about 40-50% of the time, so pigeonholing Alabama into a "3-4" team isn’t really accurate. Steele does use the fronts that he learned from Saban, Dom Capers, and Charlie McBride that are 30 and 40-based, but he has more of an NFL philosophy to defend pro-style sets. This calls for more 40 fronts and Steele has a clear preference for traditional 4-3 sets. That means he wants two big tackles to plug gaps, defensive ends that can work as spill players and rush the passer, and the traditional NFL linebacker.

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Run support by your defensive backfield is an important part of being a successful defense. Here we will discuss some basic concepts on defending the run from a defensive back’s perspective.  We will discuss both the corner's and safety's role in defending the run and elaborate on getting off of blocks to make a play on the football.

Depending on the coverage called, either the CB or the S will have an assignment in run support. That means the coaches have told him that if a rushing play is towards him or away from him, he has a specific job to do. In most coverages it is usually first denoted by "Sky" or "Cloud" calls. In terms of Cover 3, we explained this before:

A "Sky" call refers to what the Safety is doing. When this is called, usually upon seeing the strength of the formation by the FS, it is the FS and two CBs who have deep responsibilities. The SS would have primary run support (force) if this is called, and would key the RB in addition to whomever he is assigned based on the formation. The Sky call is strong against the run but weak against the quick out pass to #2 receiver on that side. This flip of the safeties (it can also be done between a S and a CB) called an inversion, and in some DC's playbooks the "force" is played by the FS instead of the SS.

A "Cloud" call refers to one of the Corners. When this is called by the FS, it is the two safeties and one of the CBs who have deep responsibilities. A OLB would shift into the underneath zone vacated by this deep CB, for example. Blitz MIKE from that shifted-OLBs usual spot, and you have a difficult read. The other CB has primary run support (force) and keys the RB in addition to his assignment. Usually the coverage rolls to the CB who has the run key and isn't playing deep, and a S lines up behind him, with the other Safety taking the middle. The Cloud call is strong against the quick out pass to #2 but weak against the run except on wide runs. Anytime the #1 receiver does not align wider than the safety is off the line of scrimmage, the Safety will check to a Cloud call which keeps the defense from being outflanked. Anytime the #1 receiver does align wider than the safety is off the line of scrimmage, the Safety will make the Sky or Cloud call according to the coverage called by the coach. So you see, it all depends on how they line up.

Cornerback:

In general, a "hard" corner’s responsibility (most often seen in Cover 2) is to cover the flats and become the force on any outside runs. He'll usually be jamming the #1 receiver at the LOS. You will often see this defender line up 5 yards off the ball or on the LOS and he will normally utilize a variation of the slide technique, if he drops at all. This means that the defender can keep his eyes on the backfield while looking at the flats with peripheral vision…perfect for run support.  In terms of what we said above, hard corners are playing "Cloud" support, essentially.

Softer coverage (corner playing around 7 yards off the LOS) can also allow the corner to look in to the backfield, especially if the DB is utilizing a slide step or the defense is in zone. The defender who is comfortable enough peering into the backfield WHILE playing proper defense will obviously be more reactive to the play type.

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